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CASE NOTES

to maintain secrecy about the statement had been abandoned. In all such
considerations regarding the scope of the privilege and its possible waiver,
the intent and needs of the parties should be emphasized.
Thomas J. Bradley

TAXATION-GAIN

ON SALE OF EXTRACTED EARTH FILL IS ORDINARY

INCOME.

Lautdenslager v. Commissioner (3d Cir. 1962)
The taxpayer owned property which he used as a residence and
farm and which adjoined a highway construction project. The taxpayer
entered into an agreement with the successful bidder for the highway
contract wherein the latter agreed to buy a certain minimum quantity of
earth fill, at a fixed price per cubic yard, but subject to the provision
that if the State Highway Authority reduced the fill requirements to
the construction company, the latter could reduce its minimum accordingly.
Further, the soil had to meet certain specifications. The contract also
provided that after the agreed amount of soil had been removed, the
taxpayer, at his option, could call upon the contractor to respread the
topsoil which the latter was obliged to set aside before excavating. The
necessary fill was removed in compliance with the contract and the
taxpayer exercised his option to have the contractor respread the soil.
Thereafter, pursuant to an intention that had been expressed before
entering into the agreement with the contractor, the taxpayer sold the
land for residential purposes. Its use as such was not affected by the
soil removal. The taxpayer reported the proceeds from the sale of
the fill as a long-term capital gain. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the district director and the Tax
Court, holding that under the present circumstances, since there was no
sale of earth fill in place, the proceeds were to be counted as ordinary
income. Laudenslager v. Commissioner, 305 F. 2d 686 (3d Cir. 1962).
A transaction involving the extraction of natural deposits from the
taxpayer's land may give rise to either capital gain or ordinary income,
depending on whether the transaction qualifies as a sale or lease.'
Preferential tax treatment as a long-term capital gain will be afforded to
the taxpayer provided he can prove the transaction is a sale of a capital
asset held for more than six months. 2 However, if the transaction involves
1. Barker v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1221, 1222(3).

A capital asset is defined in §

1221 as:

All property held by taxpayer except: (1) property held primarily for
sale to customers (2) depreciable property or real property used in trade or
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a lease the proceeds will-be taxed as ordinary income. 3 At the present
time there appear to be two distinct tests applied by the courts in deter4
mining whether the transaction qualifies as a sale or a lease. The Third
and Ninth 5 Circuits and the Tax Court6 follow the retained economic
interest test, while the First,7 Second" and Fifth 9 Circuits adhere to the
intent of the parties test.
The retained economic interest test was supported by the oil and
gas producers who sought to prevent a sale of royalty interests and
thereby take advantage of the percentage depletion provision 0 rather than
the capital gain provisions of the Code. If the application of this test
indicates an economic interest was retained by the taxpayer, the transaction will be determined a lease." The United States Supreme Court
stated that an economic interest was retained when the taxpayer had: (1)
"acquired, by investment, an interest in the oil in place," and (2) secured by legal relationship "income derived from the extraction of the
oil, to which he must look for return of his capital."' 12 This standard of
determining the existence of a retained economic interest was applied to
transactions concerning natural deposits in place, such as sand, earth
fill or gravel.' 3 Generally, the existence of an interest in the deposit in
place is rarely the subject of controversy between the taxpayer and the
business (3) a copyright, a literary musical, or artistic composition (4) accounts or notes receivable (5) certain short-term discount obligations issued
by government.
A long term capital gain is defined in § 1222(3) as:
The term long-term capital gain means gain from sale or exchange of a
capital asset held for more than 6 months ....
3. INT. Rnv. CODE oF 1954, § 61 (a) (6).
4. Laudenslager v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1962).
5. Gowans v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1957) which held that a
removal of all sand was a sale even though there was a unit price and provision for
monthly payments. Although the court used the retained economic interest concept,
it did look beyond the terms of the contract to discover its principal purpose. 246
F.2d 448, 451. Cf. Note, 71 HARv. L. R~v. 376 (1958).
6. Samuel L. Green, 35 T.C. 1065 (1961). Note that the Tax Court in the
present case based its decision solely on the Green case.
7. Linehan v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1957), stated that a removal
of sand and gravel at fixed prices per cubic yard was a sale. Cf. Note, 30 U. CINC.
L. REv. 534 (1961) which said the failure to use words of sale and absence of
quantities did not make this a very significant decision.
8. Barker v. Commissioner, supra note 1, where no minimum quantities, but
minimum quarterly payments, were deemed evidence of a sale.
9. Crowell Land & Mining Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir.
1957), where contractor had five years to remove all sand and gravel, and, at the
end of five years, materials not removed would revert to taxpayer. The Court
found a sale. Cf. Note 46, Gto. L.J. 359 (1958) where the author sees no reason
why these transactions cannot be treated as a sale so long as there is the requisite
intent. But see Case Note, 71 HARV. L. Rev. 376 (1958) which criticized the
decision.
10. INT. RZv. CODE OF 1954, § 613:
"Allowance Of Deduction For Depletion. (a) General Rule: In the case of
mines, oil and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber, there shall be
allowed as a deduction in computing taxable income a reasonable allowance for
depletion .... "
Cf. SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INcOM4 TAXATION 782-83 (1960) where the
"royalty" area in general is discussed.
11. E.g., Gowans v. Commissioner, supra note 5.
12. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 557, 53 S. Ct. 225, 226 (1933).
13. Gowans v. Commissioner, supra note 5.
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Commissioner. 14 The critical question has been whether there existed
a legal relationship to which the taxpayer must look for a return of his
capital. 15 Among the factors which have been considered by various
courts as significant in determining whether the required legal relationship
was present was whether the taxpayer must look solely to the extraction
of the natural deposit for the return of his capital ;16whether there was
provided a unit price and a clause allowing for monthly payments ;17
whether the contracting parties used such terms as "lessor," "lessee" and
"royalties" to describe the transaction;18 whether the payments were
based on the retail sales value of the extracted deposit ;19 whether the
transferor reserved a royalty of a percentage of the minerals to be produced 20 or of a stated amount per unit mined and sold ;21 and whether
22
the transferor had a right to share in the net profits of production.
Although the intent of the parties test, on the other hand, is
relatively new in this area of taxation, 23 there have been hints of it in
several older cases. For instance, in Barker v. Commissioner,24 the court
indicated that one should "look beyond the mere phraseology of the agreement and determine its substance," that is, try to determine whether "the
parties intended present passing of title."' 25 Also, in Crowell Land & Mining
Corp. v. Commissioner,26 the court indicated that there should be an analysis
of the contract of sale to see if it showed as its main purpose an intention
to convey the entire interest in the deposits. More recently in Linehan v.
Commissioner,27 the First Circuit stated that the "true substance" of
the transaction should be examined and not merely the contractual words.
In attempting to fix the parties' intention, the courts have looked at
such factors as the condition and value of the land after the excavation
14. Ibid. But note that the court conceded that the commissioner might dispute
this "if the taxpayer is claiming that the proceeds are regular income, subject to
a depletion allowance." 246 F.2d 448, 451 (n.4).
15. Robert M. Dann, 30 T.C. 499 (1958), where an agreement which contained
provisions indicating all usable soil would be taken was termed a sale with no
economic interest retained. The evidence showed that the tracts were useless after
the excavation.
16. Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 76 S. Ct. 395
(1956).
17. Ibid.
18. Albritton v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1957).
19. Ibid.
20. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 53 S.Ct. 74 (1932).
21. Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Burner, 287 U.S. 308, 53 S.Ct. 150 (1932).
22. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25, 66 S.Ct. 861 (1946).
23. Linehan v. Commissioner, supra note 7.
24. Supra note 1.
25. Id. at 197.
26. Supra note 9. Note especially where the court stated that there was an
intention "to convey the entire interest of Crowell for a price to be determined as
fixed in it and to be paid in cash in installments. There was no provision or suggestion in it for the retention and payment of a royalty as in oil and gas leases. A
bona fide sale was the intent of the parties and it was expressed in terms free
from ambiguity throughout the intrument in the provisions and conditions it set
out. Looking to the actual circumstances as well as the language of the contract of
sale, there is no occasion or basis for resorting to legal niceties of interpretation to
defeat the basic purpose and effect of the transaction." 242 F.2d at 866.
27. Supra note 7 at 279.
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was completed, 28 the obligations of the parties under the contract, 29 the
manner of computing the purchase price,30 the method of payment, 31 the
33
terms used in the agreement, 32 the time limitations of the agreement,
34
and the purpose of the contract.
If an application of the test indicates
the parties intended a sale, the transaction will be determined a sale. 35
The present court applied the retained economic interest test. It
reasoned, first, that the contractor had not really bound himself to
remove a minimum amount of fill, since the ostensible minimum set forth
in the taxpayer-contractor agreement could be reduced if the Highway
Authority decreased the amount of fill required to be furnished by the
contractor. Secondly, the court noted that the contractor did not have to
take any fill which did not meet the Highway Authority's specifications.
For these two reasons the court concluded the taxpayer had retained an
economic interest. 36 Apparently the rationale of the court was that the
taxpayer, since he failed to convey an absolute interest, must have retained an interest himself. It is submitted that the above factors, although properly considered by the court, are not sufficient to indicate
that an economic interest had been retained. First, it seems that the most
important question to be considered in applying the retained economic
interest test was not asked by the court in the instant decision: must the
taxpayer look solely to the extraction of the natural deposit for the return
of his capital. The evidence in the present case showed that the taxpayer's
property had become quite valuable with the coming of the highway and
that he had intended to sell it for residential purposes even before the
excavation agreement was consummated. In fact, he paid to have the
top soil respread in order to sell the land for residential purposes. The
taxpayer did not have to look to the proceeds of the sale of the fill for a
return of his capital. Were it not for this fact, the court's decision
would have been greatly strengthened. Secondly, the amounts the taxpayer was to receive were in no way dependent upon the contractor's
sales price or profits from the latter's contract with the State Highway
Authority.
As stated above, although the retained economic interest test had
been originally developed to cover transactions involving the removal of
oil and gas, the concept has been carried over, by the courts, to transactions involving natural deposits in place, such as sand, earth fill and
gravel. Because the quality of these natural deposits is generally diffi28. Gowans v. Commissioner, supra note 5; Linehan v. Commissioner, supra

note 7.

29. Barker v. Commissioner, supra note 1.
30. Ibid.
31. Crowell Land & Mining Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 9; Linehan v.
Commissioner, supra note 7.
32. Linehan v. Commissioner, supra note 7.
33. Crowell Land & Mining Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 9.
34. Gowans v. Commissioner, supra note 5.
35. E.g. Barker v. Commissioner, supra note 1.
36. But see Robert M. Dann, supra note 15.
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